Shukan Shincho may also be responsible for introducing in Japan what today is referred to as "narrative journalism," or journalism that tells a story. The dubious nature of Shukan Shincho's brand of narrative -- sometimes referred to as the Shukan Shincho "literary art style," or "literary-narrative journalism" -- will be considered in detail later in this chapter. In broad terms, this style represented a bold departure from the unequivocally formal, staid approach used by most other Japanese news gatherers. Daringly, it featured informal Japanese language, which was not associated with the presentation of news, but which was easier and more enjoyable for everyday readers. The narrative style adopted also called for a significant amount of interpretation, often even serious exaggeration and invention of facts by reporters, in order to ensure that each story was as intriguing to readers as possible, although the story itself might only have been pieced together from a handful of established facts. Of course, the style is naturally suited to scandals or other stories that deal with moral failures. This preoccupation with scandals was not unprecedented at Shinchosha Ltd., Shukan Shincho's publisher. One of the company's founders, Giryo Sato, had previously established a publishing company called Shinseisha in July 1896. Shinseisha put out a magazine called Shinsei, as well as a number of books. In July 1899, Sato himself wrote and published a particularly interesting book entitled Bundan Fubun-ki, which translates as "A Record of Rumors in the Literary World." In subsequent years, the magazine Shinsei also published scandalous information about a famous poet of the time, Tekkan Yosano, for which the poet sued the company. In 1903, Sato eventually gave up on a struggling Shinseisha, with its ownership transferred to new owners, but he restarted his publishing ventures the following year under the new name Shinchosha. In addition to Shukan Shincho's literary-narrative journalism, the magazine was also successful in identifying and capturing the resurgent feelings of Japanese national pride that began to emerge in the 1950s. As the Japanese economy regained its feet after the war, and with the end of more than six years of occupation, a growing sense of resentment against the United States began to simmer among the population. The feeling was compounded by issues surrounding the fact that the United States had not yet relinquished control of Okinawa and other Japanese islands. This anti-American sentiment was perhaps best symbolized by the clean-cut "all-Japanese" wrestling star Rickidozan, who, like so many other Japanese cultural icons, was of Korean descent. Rickidozan routinely beat up on American wrestlers, especially his archenemies the Sharpe Brothers, to the great delight of Japanese fans. Thus, while Shukan Shincho is known today for its staunch support of the ruling LDP and its unapologetically pro-U.S. stance on international policy, the magazine's early years were marked by a distinctively anti-American slant. Not that Shukan Shincho was filled with heady op-ed pieces against the United States -- it simply capitalized on an undercurrent of resentment by featuring inflammatory articles that portrayed the United States in a negative light whenever possible. Articles on the various transgressions by U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan were a favorite and a big seller. Jun Kamei, a former career Shukan Shincho writer and assistant editor, recalls that in his early years at the magazine it was well known that anti-Americanism was an overt part of Shukan Shincho's early editorial policy. This fundamentally pro-Japanese policy played a pivotal role in popularizing Shukan Shincho and in laying the foundation for its antiestablishment stance, still struck by the magazine today. Documents at the U.S. National Archives show that in the late 1950s the U.S. State Department, focused as it was with fighting the cold war, had made specific moves to co-opt the Japanese government into a covert policy to engender positive feelings there about the United States. This scheme was clearly laid out in the so-called Draft Psychology Strategy Plan for the Pro-U.S. Orientation of Japan and the National Psychology Program for Japan. The success or failure of these programs, as well as the extent of participation by the Japanese government in them, will bear further research and is beyond the scope of this book. However, and especially in light of revelations that the CIA secretly provided the LDP with millions of dollars to help keep it in power, there is no doubt that many portions of the Japanese establishment worked (especially through the mainstream press) to encourage amity toward the United States at that time. As a result, the Japanese news-media marketplace was wide open for the fledgling, populist Shukan Shincho to garner a readership through anti-American news coverage. This was true until at least 1972, when the normalization of Japanese relations with China appears to have resulted in a shift in politics at the magazine, which has been decidedly pro-U.S. ever since. Soon other nonnewspaper shukanshi publishers took their cues from Shukan Shincho's profitable model, especially its populist approach to the news, its antiestablishment slant, and its use of a literary-narrative journalistic style. Today, however, the antiestablishment posturing by Shukan Shincho and its imitators is only that: posturing. For they are anything but antiestablishment. Indeed, they are firm fixtures of the Japanese power-elite status quo. Hajime Kitamura, former head of the Japan Federation of Press Workers' Unions, former editor in chief of Sunday Mainichi weekly newsmagazine, and current head of public relations for Mainichi Shimbun, made an important point along these lines in an interview for this book. According to Kitamura, when Japanese weekly newsmagazines started out, they were so small, especially in comparison with the dailies, that they had little choice but to use unconventional methods to gather news and attract readers. However, they have since become quite powerful and well established. Unfortunately, he says, they still act like -- and are largely perceived as -- relatively small, outsider forces and thus have not changed their original tactics and approach: "The weeklies in Japan began with their ability to use what I would describe as 'guerrilla-tactic journalism.' But they are no longer guerrillas. Their influence has grown tremendously. The dailies learned about the potentially destructive nature of their power during World War II, when they helped galvanize public opinion behind the militarists. They know how easily they can influence things or ruin people socially. So far, however, the weeklies do not seem to have come to fully appreciate their powers. I think that if they had more self-awareness, they would hold back quite a bit. I think we are at a point where we really need to step up and evaluate. The weeklies have been criticizing the dailies for some time now, but the dailies on the whole just ignore the weeklies. They haven't acknowledged the power of the weeklies either. But it's time the whole industry, and society at large, acknowledges their power."
<<previous 1 . 2 . 3 . 4 next>>>
|
